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Uber’s Dilemma: How the ADA May End 
the On-Demand Economy 
Bryan Casey 
12 U. MASS. L. REV. 124 
ABSTRACT 
This article is the first to point out that a few relatively low-profile lawsuits 
involving Uber’s liability under the ADA could have an outcome-determinative 
effect on O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the blockbuster employment 
misclassification case brought against the startup by its own drivers. Because both 
types of lawsuits hinge on the role that drivers play within Uber’s business model, a 
ruling in favor of ADA liability which compelled Uber to exert additional control 
over its drivers would also, in turn, jeopardize the drivers’ legal status as independent 
contractors. Such an outcome would be catastrophic to Uber’s core business model, 
costing the company hundreds of millions—if not billions—of dollars. And because 
Uber is but one of hundreds of Silicon Valley startups to have adopted a similar 
business model, a misclassification ruling against the tech giant could set in motion a 
domino effect that impacts scores of companies throughout the “on-demand” 
economy. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars may hang in the balance of 
a few ADA cases. So, too, may the rights of some 57 million Americans with 
disabilities, for whom victory could come to represent a major civil rights milestone. 
AUTHOR NOTE 
Bryan Casey is a J.D. candidate at Stanford Law School, class of 2018. The author 
particularly thanks Joan Petersilia, Adelbert H. Sweet Professor of Law at Stanford 
Law School and faculty co-director of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center, as well 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
aindrops patter against the windowpane of Kristin Parisi’s Boston 
office as the clouds of an April storm break open above.
1
 Parisi is 
hardly conscious of it nowadays, but she tends to be acutely aware of 
the weather. To her, the sight of droplets trickling down a windowpane 
represents something far different than it might to the rest of us. Ever 
since a childhood car accident left her paralyzed from the waist down, 
rain has come to signify an obstacle that can prove as formidable to 
her as a flight of stairs lacking a handicap accessible alternative. 
Relying on a wheelchair to get around means that, without the right 
combination of planning and anticipation, a sudden storm could leave 
her completely exposed to the elements—a state of affairs that adds 
fresh new ironies to the phrase: “Staying a step ahead of the weather.” 
After all, unlike most of her fellow Bostonians, Parisi cannot simply 
dart into a subway terminal to wait out a downpour until a cab arrives. 
After more than twenty-five years in a wheelchair, Parisi’s 
heightened concern for the weather has become almost second-nature 
to her. “It’s one of those things I forget—that I’m disabled—until 
someone tells me I am,” she often says.
2
 Yet on this April day in 2015, 
it is not the rain, but something else entirely, that reminds Parisi of her 
disability. 
Only minutes before departing her office, Parisi had arranged for a 
ride home using a software application developed by a multibillion-
dollar Silicon Valley startup named Uber. The thirty-year-old public 
relations executive had used her smartphone to request a ride and been 
paired—through the application—with a nearby vehicle-for-hire 
affiliated with the company. As the Uber driver pulled up to Parisi in a 




                                                          
1
 This anecdote is adapted using quotations from two interviews of Kirstin Parisi 
featured on The Daily Beast and CNET. See Dara Kerr, What Is Uber Doing To 
Train Its Drivers On Disability Rights?, CNET (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/what-is-uber-doing-to-train-drivers-on-disability-
rights/ [https://perma.cc/YVW2-NJZQ]; Nina Strochlic, Uber: Disability Laws 




 Strochlic, supra note 1. 
3
 Kerr, supra note 1. 
R 
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“No, no, no,” the driver said as he gestured dismissively toward 
her wheelchair. “That’s never going to fit in my car.”
4
 
“It will,” replied Parisi, before patiently explaining that her 
wheelchair—which weighs a grand total of 15 pounds and can be 
folded to a fraction of its normal size—can easily fit into the trunk of 
her own compact car. 
Parisi continued to press, but the driver remained adamant. Their 
back-and-forth went on at length until, finally, Parisi felt no other 
choice than to concede defeat. 
The rain fell unabated. Parisi watched from the curb as the Uber 
driver’s spacious Mercedes sped off and melded into the Boston 
traffic. On this occasion, as luck would have it, she managed to get a 
ride home from a generous passerby, who spotted the rain-soaked 
executive and offered to help. 
Although the Uber driver’s refusal infuriated Parisi, she did not 
plan to report the incident. Like many others faced with the quotidian 
acts of discrimination that constitute just another day in the life of a 
person with a disability, Parisi thought it best to just let it go. That is, 
until shortly thereafter, when what she had dismissed as a single stroke 
of bad luck happened again. 
“The first incident was, I thought, a fluke,” she later recalled.
5
 But 
two weeks later, after requesting an Uber vehicle to get her to the 
airport, the driver again tried to deny her a ride—complaining that the 
wheelchair would “dirty the car.”
6
 
This time, however, Parisi refused to take no for an answer. 
Against the driver’s protests, she dragged herself—and her 
wheelchair—into the back of the vehicle without any assistance. 
Securing her place in the back seat, though, did not spell the end of 
Parisi’s troubles. The driver proceeded to berate her for the entire trip 
to the airport, proclaiming that “just like [she] wouldn’t drive a dog, 
she shouldn’t be expected to take a wheelchair.”
7
 According to Parisi, 
the Uber driver also called her an “invalid.”
8
 
                                                          
4








 Strochlic, supra note 1. 
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Upon arriving at the airport, the driver had the nerve to ask 
whether Parisi would give her a bad review through the rating system 
built into Uber’s software application. 
“It has nothing to do with a bad review,” Parisi responded.
9
 “[I]t 
has to do with illegal practice. You have to understand what you’re 
doing is not only mean—it’s against the law.”
10
 
These two incidents in quick succession spurred Parisi to lodge a 
complaint with Uber. “This was the worst transportation experience of 
my life,” she wrote in a report to the company.
11
 She added, “I’m 
humiliated”—quite a statement considering the thick skin one tends to 
develop after living with a disability for almost twenty-five years.
12
 
Uber responded by offering Parisi a refund for her ride, as well as a 
$100 company gift card.
13
 But she does not intend to use the card until 
Uber makes changes that would prevent the same kinds of refusals 
from occurring in the future.
14
 
Parisi said that after receiving the gift card, she again contacted 
Uber, stating: “You need to do something about this and do it publicly. 
Say, ‘We see this as a problem and we’re not going to fight the public 
on this and do the right thing.’”
15
 But according to Parisi, what Uber 
instead said was that, “[because it’s] a technology platform, not a 
public service[. . .] the ADA
16
 does not apply to [Uber].”
17
 
If Parisi’s description of Uber’s response has a familiar ring to it, 
there is good reason why. Her exchange with Uber is not the first time 
the multibillion-dollar company has invoked the defense that it is 
merely a “technology platform” after being accused of violating the 
law.
18
 In fact, the response is strikingly similar to the legal defense 
Uber recently adopted in answer to the headline-grabbing class action 
















 Parisi’s use of the acronym ADA refers to a federal anti-discrimination statute 
known as the Americans with Disabilities Act, discussed in detail below. See 
Part IV infra. 
17
 Kerr, supra note 1. 
18
 See infra Part IV. 
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lawsuit brought by its own drivers, who allege Uber has misclassified 
them as independent contractors instead of as employees.
19
 The case, 
O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., has received widespread media 
attention thanks, in part, to the possibility that a ruling in favor of the 
drivers could spell hundreds of millions of dollars in additional costs 
for a company that many consider to be “the most successful Silicon 
Valley startup ever.”
20
 Some commentators have even likened it to an 
employment misclassification suit brought against FedEx by its own 
drivers, which eventually settled for $228 million.
21
 
Far less attention, however, has been paid to a seemingly unrelated 
set of lawsuits also featuring Uber’s use of the “technology platform” 
defense.
22
 Across the country—in states such as California, Arizona, 
and Texas—dozens of individuals with wheelchairs or guide dogs 
have filed suit against Uber, alleging that the company discriminated 
against them based on their disability.
23
 Many of the documented 
incidents bear a disconcerting resemblance to those reported by Parisi. 
Customers with disabilities have allegedly been cursed at and yelled at 
by Uber drivers.
24
 Others have allegedly been abandoned in extreme 
weather.
25
 One passenger has even accused an Uber driver of stuffing 
her guide dog in the trunk of a vehicle without her consent.
26
 
                                                          
19
 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
20
 Henry Ross, Ridesharing’s House of Cards: O’Connor V. Uber Tech., Inc. and 
the Viability of Uber’s Labor Model in Washington, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1431, 
1431 (2015); see also Carmel DeAmicis, Uber Could Have to Pay an Additional 




 DeAmicis, supra note 20; see also Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 
Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014). 
22
 Martin De Caro, Uber Does Not Serve Disabled People, Say D.C. Advocates, 




 Strochlic, supra note 1; see also Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015); McPhail v. Lyft, Inc., No. A-14-
CA-829-LY, 2015 WL 1143098 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2015); Ramos v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. SA-14-CA-502-XR, 2015 WL 758087 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 
2015). 
24
 See Complaint, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 3:14-
CV-4086, 2014 WL 4628579 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 9, 2014). 
25
 Id. at ¶ 3. 
26
 Id. at ¶ 46. 
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With hundred-million-dollar figures looming in the background of 
Uber’s employment misclassification case, a few suits featuring 
customers with wheelchairs or guide dogs may seem to be the least of 
the company’s worries. But a closer examination of the overlapping 
issues involved in both types of lawsuits reveals that—though their 
subject matter is seemingly unconnected—their outcomes may in fact 
be inextricably linked. Indeed, Uber’s lackluster response to its 
drivers’ alleged misconduct might simply be a symptom of a far more 
systemic problem ailing the famous startup. It may not be that Uber 
lacks the will to do what Parisi describes as “the right thing” for its 
customers with disabilities.
27
 Rather, it may be that doing the right 
thing, as Parisi and others envision it would imperil the company’s 
entire way of doing business. 
Uber’s business model currently hinges on classifying its more 
than 160,000 U.S. drivers as independent contractors instead of as 
employees.
28
 This distinction saves Uber from paying hundreds of 
millions of dollars in benefits to which its drivers would otherwise be 
entitled as W-2 employees under state and federal law.
29
 These savings 
translate into a significant competitive advantage that has propelled 
Uber’s meteoric rise from shoestring startup to multibillion-dollar 
transportation titan in the span of just a few short years.
30
 
But because the pioneering company’s business model is unlike 
any that have come before it, Uber is essentially operating in a legal 
grey area with respect to its workers’ employment status. The validity 
of its independent contractor classification has never actually been 
affirmed by a court—in fact, the opposite has occurred. Just last year, 
a federal court expressed deep skepticism toward Uber’s classification 
                                                          
27
 Kerr, supra note 1. 
28
 Emily Badger, Now We Know How Many Drivers Uber Has — And Have A 





 DeAmicis, supra note 20; see also Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 
1074 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Employees are generally entitled to, among other 
things, minimum wage and overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, reimbursement 
for work-related expenses, workers’ compensation, and employer contributions 
to unemployment insurance.”). 
30
 Lucas E. Buckley et al., The Intersection of Innovation and the Law How 
Crowdfunding and the on-Demand Economy Are Changing the Legal Field, 
WYO. LAW., 36, 38 (Aug. 2015). 
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of its drivers in a pretrial ruling issued in O’Connor v. Uber 
Technologies, Inc.
31
 According to the court, the question of whether 
Uber’s drivers should be classified as independent contractors, as 




In California, where O’Connor is being litigated, the “principal test 
of an employment relationship is whether the [employer] has the right 
to control the manner and means” by which a worker accomplishes the 
employer’s desired result.
33
 The test is highly complex and involves a 
multifactor analysis, but essentially it boils down to this maxim: The 
more control an employer exerts over its workers’ conduct, the more 
likely they are to be classified as employees.
34
 
Viewed through this lens, the true impetus behind Uber’s 
invocation of the “technology platform” defense in response to 
accusations of discrimination against its drivers is made readily 
apparent. With hundreds of millions of dollars turning on California’s 
“control” test of an employment relationship, someone such as Kristin 
Parisi may say, “[D]o the right thing,” but all Uber can hear is the 
word “control.”
35
 From Uber’s standpoint, steadfastly insisting that it 
is merely a “technology platform” which bears no responsibility for 
controlling its drivers’ conduct is its best means of guarding against an 
employment misclassification ruling that could dismantle its entire 
business model.
36
 For all the startup knows, any changes to its policies 
and procedures—even something as minor as mandatory disability 
training for its drivers—may be the decisive factor that tips the scales 
in the direction of a potentially devastating ruling. 
The result of this delicately-poised situation is a dilemma of 
staggering economic and moral significance. On the one hand, Uber’s 
unwillingness to take additional responsibility for controlling its 
drivers’ conduct all but ensures that individuals with disabilities will 
                                                          
31




 Alexander, 765 F.3d at 988 (citing S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. 




 Kerr, supra note 1. 
36
 Roger Chapin, Company Refuses to Follow Rules: Front Burner, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (July 3, 2014), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2014-07-
03/news/os-ed-front-burner-uber-con-20140702_1_uberx-taxi-regulations-
orlando-interNat’l-airport [https://perma.cc/9YFD-3S5Q]. 
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continue to face discrimination.
37
 But on the other hand, earnestly 
attempting to do what Parisi and others describe as “the right thing” 
could profoundly impact Uber’s employment relationship with its 
drivers—and, in so doing, jeopardize the very business model that has 
enabled the startup’s unprecedented success.
38
 
As if those stakes alone were not high enough, the choice Uber 
ultimately makes in navigating this dilemma may not even be its own. 
A ruling in favor of the plaintiffs who have sued Uber for 
discriminating against customers with disabilities would force the 
company to take legal responsibility for controlling its drivers’ 
misbehavior—an outcome that would fundamentally alter its existing 
employment relationship.
39
 And because Uber is but one of several 
hundred Silicon Valley startups now operating under a similar 
business model, the ruling could set in motion a domino effect—first 
toppling over Uber’s independent contractor classification, then 
sending others throughout Silicon Valley tumbling.
40
 Indeed, the fate 
of not just Uber, but also scores of companies whose cumulative 
valuations number well into the billions of dollars, may rest on the 
outcomes of a few unlikely lawsuits involving disability rights.
41
 
Part II of this piece discusses the transformative effect that 
software application-based companies, such as Uber, have had on the 
modern transportation industry in the last decade. It argues that the 
unprecedented success of Uber’s pioneering business model has led to 
a similarly unprecedented crisis of identity for the startup. With 
hundreds of millions of dollars hanging in the balance—and numerous 
lawsuits filed throughout the country—the stage is set for a judicial 
showdown of tremendous consequence. 
Part III examines in detail some of the key legal ambiguities 
surrounding Uber’s independent contractor classifications. It argues 
that an employment misclassification ruling in O’Connor v. Uber 
Technologies, Inc. could be a defining moment in Silicon Valley that 
stands to impact hundreds of other similarly-situated startups. 
                                                          
37




 See Complaint, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 3:14-
CV-4086, 2014 WL 4628579 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 9, 2014). 
40
 See infra Part III. 
41
 See infra Part IV. 
2017 Uber's Dilemma 133 
Part IV demonstrates that a few relatively low-profile 
discrimination lawsuits against Uber have inadvertently created a 
major dilemma for the startup. It argues that a ruling requiring Uber to 
accommodate customers with disabilities could also tip its drivers’ 
delicately-balanced employment status in favor of a misclassification 
decision—potentially setting off a chain reaction of misclassification 
rulings throughout Silicon Valley. 
This piece concludes by arguing that the dilemma facing Uber is a 
matter of not just economic, but also moral, significance. Its resolution 
will have lasting implications for the 57 million Americans with 
disabilities who—more than twenty-five years after the passage of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act—continue to experience troubling 
disparities in access to transportation across the U.S.
 42
 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES 
In the last decade, a number of companies have emerged that claim 
to offer a sleeker “alternative to what they view as the inefficiencies of 
traditional taxis services.”
43
 Their premise is simple: the companies 
use smartphone-based software applications (“apps”) to connect 
people seeking rides with private drivers offering vehicles-for-hire.
44
 
In the span of just a few years, this new generation of startups has 
“wedged [its] way into a once airtight taxi market,” historically 
dominated by complex regulatory schemes and monopolistic behaviors 
that gave rise to high transaction costs and service quality problems.
45
 
Taking advantage of the natural efficiencies created by advances in 
smartphone computing power and global positioning systems (“GPS”), 
these companies have “brought new technology, new price structures, 
and consistently reliable service” into a private transportation market 
that had seen little in the way of innovation over the last half-
century.
46
 These app-based transportation companies are often referred 
                                                          
42
 Humphrey Taylor et al., The ADA, 20 Years Later, 115, KESSLER FOUND. AND 
NAT’L ORG. ON DISABILITY (July 2010); see also Transportation Equity: Ensure 








 Id. at 1434. 
46
 Id. at 1433. 
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to as Transportation Networking Companies (“TNCs”), or more 
colloquially, as “ridesharing” services—though the business model 
resembles hailing a cab more than sharing a ride.
47
 
Becoming a driver for one such company requires little more than 
owning a vehicle and a smartphone with an internet connection.
48
 
Drivers who wish to offer transportation-for-hire simply download the 
app of their preferred TNC, submit their personal vehicle for 
inspection, undertake an in-person interview, and undergo some form 
of background check.
49
 The app provider hires qualifying applicants as 
independent contractors with no fixed hours or minimum wage.
50
 Once 
hired, drivers elect when, where, and for how long they wish to offer 
their services on the app by indicating their availability to customers 
through their smartphones.
51
 There is no minimum number of hours a 
driver must work, nor a minimum number of required rides a driver 
must provide.
52
 Only after 180 days of consecutive inactivity does a 
driver’s eligibility to work for the app expire.
53
 
Customers seeking a vehicle-for-hire can download the app, 
register an account with the company, and submit a request for a 
ride.
54
 After the request has been submitted, the app uses the GPS of 
both parties’ smartphones to pair the customer with the nearest 
                                                          
47
 Complaint, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-
4086, 2014 WL 4628579 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 9, 2014). 
48
 Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 86-
87 (2015). 
49
 See Ramos v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. SA-14-CA-502-XR, 2015 WL 758087, at 
*11 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015) (“[A]nyone with a valid driver’s license, car 
insurance, a clean record and a four-door vehicle can log onto the App and 
connect with ride-seekers.”); see also Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1070 (“To be a 
Lyft driver, a person must download the app, submit his car for inspection, 
undergo some form of background check, and submit to an in-person interview 
with a Lyft representative.”). 
50
 Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069-70. 
51




 Drivers can reapply after their account expires for inactivity. Angela 
Moscaritolo, California: Uber Driver an Employee, Not a Contractor, PC 




 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2014 WL 1760314, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. May 2, 2014). 
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available driver, and then plots the fastest route between pickup and 
drop-off locations.
55
 Afterward, the app relays an estimate of the fare 
to the customer, as well as a best approximation of the driver’s time of 
arrival—which is updated in real-time on the customer’s phone as the 
driver approaches.
56
 Once the customer arrives at the requested 
destination, drivers do not accept cash payments. Rather, a fee based 
on mileage, duration, and projected demand is automatically deducted 
from the customer’s credit card, which the company stores on file.
57
 
Drivers receive a share of the fee, typically in the region of eighty 
percent.
58
 The company providing the app keeps the rest. 
The contrast between ordering a ride through a TNC and hailing a 
conventional cab goes a long way toward explaining the widespread 
adoption that these companies have enjoyed over the course of just a 
few short years. Although the initial process of registering with a TNC 
can take several minutes and requires the conveyance of sensitive 
credit card information, every subsequent request for a ride is highly 
streamlined. Customers merely log onto the app, punch in their 
intended destination, and submit a request for a ride. Having done so, 
customers in most cities can expect to be picked up within a matter of 
minutes, depending on the time of day and market demand. 
TNCs market the experience as “transportation at the click of a 
button,” and unlike many overblown business slogans, this one often 
comes close to living up to its own rhetoric. By almost any measure, 
app-based transportation services offer the ordinary consumer a 
quicker, simpler, cheaper, and more reliable alternative to hailing a 
                                                          
55





 How Does Uber Work?, UBER TECH., INC., https://help.uber.com/h/738d1ff7-
5fe0-4383-b34c-4a2480efd71e [https://perma.cc/5UEU-GXY3]; see also Cotter, 
60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069-70. Some previous iterations of the model operated on a 
more discretionary “donation” system that more resembled traditional taxi 
payments. For simplicity, this essay does not dwell on the distinction. 
58
 O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142. This percentage has changed significantly in 
recent months, with the addition of new pricing structures, such as “surge 
pricing.” New drivers now typically receive less than 80% of the fare total. 
Older drivers remain grandfathered in to 80% rate. See Sage Lazzaro, Uber 
Drivers Plan Boycott After Fare Cuts Slash Their Earnings to Below Minimum 
Wage, THE OBSERVER ONLINE (Jan. 1 2016), http://observer.com/2016/01/uber-
drivers-plan-boycott-after-fare-cuts-slash-their-earnings-to-below-minimum-
wage/ [https://perma.cc/V3VN-NXRE]. 
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conventional cab. With TNCs, customers can tell whether a ride is 
available—and at what cost—with little more than a glance downward 
at their phone. There is no placing of calls to multiple dispatchers with 
hopes of tracking down an available cabby, no flailing of one’s arms 
on a street corner trying to catch a driver’s attention, no wondering 
whether an approaching cab might arbitrarily pass by, and no 
wandering onto the street uncertain of whether a taxi will even be in 
the area. Better still, there is no need to carry any cash, no need to 
calculate a tip, and no need to even reach for a wallet or purse. And if 
those differences were not enough to sway some consumers, TNCs 
also provide a rating system that allows customers to evaluate drivers 
based on the quality of their service, which companies can use to 
screen workers and monitor them for optimal performance.
59
 
A. Transportation Network Companies’ Disruptive Effect on 
the Private Transportation Industry 
With great innovation, of course, comes great market disruption. 
Less than a decade since their inception, TNCs have come to represent 
an existential threat to conventional cab companies the world over.
60
 A 
new generation of tech-savvy consumers has flocked to the ease and 
inexpense of this new breed of transportation provider, leaving bricks-
and-mortar taxi services largely in the lurch. Public opinion surveys 
offer a glimpse into some of the consumer forces driving this rapid 
shift. In a study commissioned by the City of Seattle in September 
2013—at a time when TNCs “were growing in the area”—more than 
ninety percent of TNC customers rated the response time for TNC 
vehicle-for-hire requests as “Good” or “Very Good.”
61
 By contrast, 
                                                          
59
 Ross, supra note 20, at 1440. 
60
 See infra Part IV. 
61
 Id. But see Lisa Rayle et al., App-Based, On-Demand Ride Services: Comparing 
Taxi and Ridesourcing Trips and User Characteristics in San Francisco, U.C. 
TRANSP. CTR. (Nov. 2014) 
http://www.its.dot.gov/itspac/Dec2014/RidesourcingWhitePaper_Nov2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KVQ4-3RYK] (“Bias and inaccuracy in respondent perception 
or recollection of wait time might partially account for the difference between 
modes. For instance, ridesourcing apps provide the user with an estimated wait 
time, but the actual wait time may be longer—without the user noticing or 
recalling the longer wait. In contrast, respondents may overestimate taxi wait 
times. For example, they may recall one negative experience more than several 
positive ones. Even so, ridesourcing’s short wait times and consistency across 
time and location—or at least perceptions of quick, consistent response—
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just fifty percent of traditional taxi customers rated their vehicle’s 
response time as “Good” or “Very Good.”
62
 The study also found that 
“[o]f 105 negative comments” received during the survey, “102 were 
related to taxis.”
63
 Further, “[o]f 16 positive comments, only 1 was 
related to taxis.”
64
 TNCs also received categorically higher customer 
ratings on six specific consumer metrics polled—”(1) willingness to 
accept credit cards, (2) courtesy of driver, (3) route knowledge of 
driver, (4) appearance of vehicle, (5) promptness of arrival, and (6) 
ease of booking/hailing a ride.”
65
 
Companies pioneering the app-based business model—with catchy 
names such as Lyft, Sidecar, and Bridj—have transformed, seemingly 
overnight, from unknown startups to household names, but none more 
so than Uber. Within a five-and-a-half-year period, the TNC went 
from a startup consisting of four people and two drivers to a global 
empire spanning six continents and operating in some 300 cities with 
over one million drivers.
66
 Uber’s latest valuation, triggered by a 
December 2015 venture capital investment round, put the company’s 
worth at $68 billion, on par with General Motors and Ford Motor 
Company.
67
 Uber’s meteoric rise “has led many to anoint [it] as the 
most successful Silicon Valley startup ever.”
68
 Like Google and a 
select few other tech behemoths, Uber has secured its place in the 
English lexicon as a verb unto itself, roughly synonymous with “to 
                                                                                                                                         
represent an important difference between ridesourcing and traditional taxis 
services from the user’s perspective.”). 
62
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 And in the business world, “Uber may be becoming a verb 
meaning to ‘radically disrupt’ an entire industry.”
70
 
B. Uber’s Identity Crisis 
Although many view Uber as tantamount to a taxi company, the 
transportation giant itself balks at the comparison. It insists it is not a 
fleet operator, but a “technology platform” that maintains a hands-off 
relationship with the drivers and passengers who use its app. Uber is 
quick to point out that it “owns no vehicles, and contends that it 
employs no drivers.”
71
 By its own semantic framework, Uber 
functions as an “intermediary” that simply “generates leads for 
[drivers] through its software.”
72
 Under Uber’s theory, it is the drivers 
who “perform services. . . for their riders, while [Uber] is an 
uninterested bystander of sorts, merely furnishing a platform that 




Uber’s business model—at least as it currently stands—hinges on 
its self-identification as a “technology platform.” For good reason, too. 
The structure allows the company to compensate drivers as 
independent contractors, not employees, while simultaneously 
allowing it to disclaim liability for a range of other state and federal 
laws that apply to traditional transportation services.
74
 After all, 
employees and regulations are expensive. Among other costs, Uber’s 
legal assumption that it is a technology platform enables it to avoid 
remedial labor statutes that impose obligations such as minimum wage 
and overtime pay requirements, meal and rest breaks for drivers, 
reimbursement for work-related expenses, workers’ compensation, 
employer contributions to unemployment insurance, Medicare and 
                                                          
69
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Social Security withholdings, and employee benefits.
75
 And what is 
more, although Uber sets internal guidelines urging its drivers to 
follow state and federal laws mandating anti-discriminatory and safety 
standards, it ultimately disclaims any “responsibility or liability for 
any transportation services provided to [riders] by such third 
parties”—a luxury not afforded to traditional taxi companies.
76
 
For a company of Uber’s size, the savings that result from this 
state of what some call “regulatory arbitrage” are staggering—by some 
estimates, in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
77
 While it is by no 
means the only reason behind Uber’s explosive growth in recent years, 
it is an important factor contributing to its ability to outcompete its 
more conventional rivals.
78
 The “technology platform” model—for 
better or for worse—simply eliminates many costs that bricks-and-




One tiny detail, however, stands in the way of Uber’s self-styled 





 Across the United States, an industry-defining 
battle has begun over the legality of Uber’s independent contractor-
based business model.
82
 As one commentator notes, while “attacking 
highly-regulated markets, acting without permission, and [upending 
longstanding trade practices] may be helpful strategies for creating a 
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competitive edge and revolutionizing an industry . . . [those] same 
factors are—not surprisingly—magnets for litigation.”
83
 
Leading the charge in this battle are a number of highly publicized 
lawsuits that have put Uber’s legal status as both an employer and a 
transportation provider at center stage.
84
 The cases have become part 
of a broader national debate—spanning news outlets, social media, and 
academic circles—that cuts to the core of the multibillion-dollar 
startup’s very identity.
85
 In one camp are those who hold that Uber is 
simply a newer, sleeker version of an age-old paradigm: a taxi 
service.
86
 They contend that a legal and regulatory framework which 
borrows from the traditional cab industry is needed in order to 
counteract the negative externalities created by the TNC business 
model.
87
 In the other camp are those who hold that Uber and its rivals 
are ushering in a new era of private transportation—and the rules that 
have historically governed the industry do not, and should not, apply 
to these pioneering enterprises.
88
 
III. UBER, EMPLOYMENT MISCLASSIFICATION, AND THE ON-
DEMAND ECONOMY 
The loudest shot yet fired in the battle over Uber’s legal identity 
sounded on January 27, 2016. Lyft, a TNC and smaller rival to Uber, 
agreed to pay $12.25 million to settle an employment misclassification 
suit brought against it in 2013.
89
 Though the Lyft settlement did not 
attract the level of media attention usually garnered by its much larger 
competitor, the eyes of Silicon Valley’s business leaders were 
watching closely. 
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The reason for this watchfulness is that Lyft and its $60 billion 
competitor, Uber, share a business model based on the classification of 
their drivers as “1099” independent contractors, a namesake owing to 
the 1099 Internal Revenue Service form associated with the status.
90
 
The structural similarities between the two companies means that 
although they are fierce competitors in the business world, in the legal 
world they oftentimes find themselves as unlikely allies.
91
 As the 
contours of the new legal landscape created by the emergence of TNCs 
continue to be defined by litigation, any outcome that impacts one 
TNC is likely to have significant implications for the others. 
The lead-up to the multimillion-dollar Lyft settlement began with a 
lawsuit, Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., brought by the TNC’s own drivers, who 
contended that under California’s legal test for distinguishing the 
employment status of workers, their relationship with Lyft better 
approximated that of full-fledged employees than that of independent 
contractors.
92
 In a pretrial denial of Lyft’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, a California district court expressed sympathy for the 
drivers’ misclassification argument, observing that “Lyft drivers don’t 
seem much like independent contractors.”
93
 The Court continued, “We 
generally understand an independent contractor to be someone with a 
special skill (and with the bargaining power to negotiate a rate for the 
use of that skill), who serves multiple clients, performing discrete tasks 
for limited periods, while exercising great discretion over the way the 
work is actually done.”
94
 According to the court, independent 
contractors constituted the types of workers who might be “found in 
the Yellow Pages to perform a task that the principal or the principal’s 
own employees were unable to perform—often something tangential 
to the day-to-day operations of the principal’s business.”
95
 Lyft 
drivers, by contrast, played a “central, not tangential [role in] Lyft’s 
business.”
96
 Further, they performed “no special skill when [giving] 
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 The Court also noted that while “Lyft might not control when 
the drivers work,” it had “a great deal of power over how they actually 
do their work, including the power to fire them [when] they don’t meet 
Lyft’s specifications about how to give rides.”
 98
 Moreover, the Court 
observed, “some Lyft drivers no doubt treat their work as a full-time 
job . . . even while they lack any power to negotiate their rate of pay. 
Indeed, this type of Lyft driver—the driver who gives ‘Lyfts’ 50 hours 
a week and relies on the income to feed his family—looks very much 
like the kind of worker the California Legislature has always intended 
to protect as an ‘employee.’”
99
 
Despite acknowledging the obvious merit to the drivers’ argument, 
the Court was also careful to emphasize that “Lyft drivers don’t seem 
like employees [either].”
100
 It observed that employees are generally 
understood “to be someone who works under the direction of a 
supervisor, for an extended or indefinite period of time, with fairly 
regular hours, receiving most or all his [or her] income from that one 
employer (or perhaps two employers).”
101
 Lyft drivers, conversely, 
could “work as little or as much as they want, and c[ould] schedule 
their driving around their other activities.”
102
 Indeed, driving for Lyft, 
the Court remarked, could be done “as a side activity” for some 
workers, “to be fit into his [or her] schedule when time permits and 
when he [or she] needs a little extra income.”
103
 
Eventually, after weighing both parties’ arguments at length, the 
court all but threw up its hands, stating, “As should now be clear, the 
jury in this case will be handed a square peg and asked to choose 
between two round holes.”
104
 Exasperated by what it described as a 
“20th Century [test] for classifying workers [that] isn’t very helpful in 
addressing this 21st Century problem,” the Court concluded: “Some 
factors point in one direction, some point in the other, and some are 














 Id. at 1069. 
104
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ambiguous. . . [a]nd because the test provides nothing remotely close 
to a clear answer, it will . . . be for [the jury] to decide.”
105
 
Upon hearing the court’s vacillating analysis, both Lyft and its 
drivers elected to settle rather than put the matter before a jury. 
Apparently, the prospect of what the court described as a virtual roll of 
the dice was considered unacceptably risky by both parties to the 
dispute. 
Had the drivers prevailed in court, Lyft would have been required 
to reclassify them as W-2 employees—an outcome that would have 
entitled them to both retroactive compensation for their prior 
misclassification and to the “many benefits and protections” afforded 
under California and federal law going forward.
106
 Instead, the 
settlement preserved their independent contractor classification, but 
required that Lyft alter its terms of service.
107
 Among other changes, 
Lyft will now need to provide a reason for terminating its drivers.
108
 
Drivers will also be able to contest termination decisions through an 
arbitration process available at the company’s expense.
109
 
Though the settlement entails some costs for the company, a ruling 
in favor of W-2 employee status, by all accounts, would have been 
significantly more expensive for the TNC. Moreover, because the 
dispute never reached trial, the true legal status of the TNC’s on-
demand workers remains an open question. 
A. O’CONNOR V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Uber, meanwhile, is continuing its own fight against an almost 
identical suit brought in its hometown of San Francisco. But unlike 
Lyft, the ride-hailing giant apparently has no intention of settling.
110
 
The case is O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
111
 It has been billed 
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as “[t]he lawsuit that could change Uber forever.”
112
 The outcome—as 
was true of the Lyft suit before it settled—is far from certain. 
What is certain, however, is that the stakes involved are massive. 
In 2015, FedEx settled an employment misclassification suit with its 
drivers for $228 million in what is widely seen as a close analog to the 
dispute at issue in O’Connor.
113
 The settlement covered “2300 [sic] 
individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in 
California between 2000 and 2007.”
114
 As in O’Connor, the drivers 
claimed their employer had misclassified them as 1099 independent 
contractors while treating them as W-2 employees. They “filed class 
action claims for a variety of alleged violations under federal and state 
law, including claims for reimbursement of business expenses, unpaid 
overtime, failure to provide meal and rest periods, reimbursement of 
deductions in pay, and non-payment of termination pay.”
115
 
The eventual settlement followed in the wake of a Ninth Circuit 
ruling which declared, resoundingly, that FedEx’s drivers were 
“employees as a matter of law.”
116
 Hearing those words uttered by 
California’s highest appellate court, undoubtedly, boded ominously for 
Uber. But even more concerning for the startup was the weight that the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision placed on aspects of FedEx’s business model 
that it shares in common with the TNC. Among other considerations, 
the ruling turned on the fact that driving for FedEx was “essential to 
FedEx’s core business,” did not require a high degree of skill,” was 
                                                          
112
 Andrew J. Hawkins, The Lawsuit That Could Change Uber Forever Has a Trial 




 FedEx Corps Adopts Mark-to-Market Pension Accounting, FedEx NEWS 




 Alexander, 765 F.3d at 984. 
115
 Id.; Richard Reibstein, $228 Million: The Cost of Independent Contractor 
Misclassification for FedEx Ground in California, IND. CONTRACTOR COMP. 




Alexander, 765 F.3d at 997. 
2017 Uber's Dilemma 145 
often defined by lengthy tenures with the company, “and involved 
customers who were FedEx’s rather than the drivers’.”
117
 
After reaching the settlement with FedEx, Beth Ross, the attorney 
representing the class of drivers, victoriously proclaimed, “The $228 
million settlement, one of the largest employment law settlements in 
recent memory, sends a powerful message to employers in California 
and elsewhere that the cost of independent contractor misclassification 
can be financially punishing, if not catastrophic, to a business.”
118
 
Whether Ross’s words will prove prophetic for TNCs has yet to be 
seen. But the $228 million figure nonetheless looms large in the 
background of Uber’s own employment classification worries. The 
class of drivers represented in O’Connor could comprise as many as 
160,000 workers—all claiming violations similar to those alleged by 
the 2,300 who filed suit against FedEx.
119
 If Uber loses in court, the 
damages owed to such a large number of misclassified workers could 
be immense. Yet even that sum might pale in comparison to the costs 
of Uber adopting an employee-based business model going forward. 
Uber is not a publicly-traded company, so a lack of financial 
transparency makes calculating the true costs of a court-mandated 
reclassification of its workers speculative at best—but that has not 
stopped some observers from trying. Uber has publicly announced that 
it has roughly 45,000 active drivers in California, a number which is 
rapidly growing.
120
 A recent commentator has estimated that 
classifying those California drivers as employees could cost the 




To put that figure into perspective, consider Uber’s current 
revenue. In August of 2015, a leaked investor presentation revealed 
that Uber’s drivers were projected to take in some $10.84 billion in 
2015, up from $2.91 billion the year before.
122
 The TNC itself keeps 
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twenty percent of the revenue from fares—meaning that its own 
earnings were in the $2 billion region that year.
123
 Of course, until 
Uber publicly releases its books, such calculations are simply educated 
guesswork. But the numbers offer a useful point of comparison. They 
reveal that the added cost of reclassifying Uber’s drivers as employees 
could consume as much ten percent of the TNC’s current net 
revenue.
124
 And that only accounts for Uber’s California drivers. 
B. O’Connor’s Implications for the On-demand Economy 
Eye-popping numbers like the $209 million figure have not 
escaped the attention of the rest of Silicon Valley.
125
 Not merely out of 
concern for the TNC’s financial future, but also because Uber is 
widely viewed as the progenitor of a whole family of copy-cat 
companies whose business models also rely on workers nebulously 
classified as independent contractors.
126
 Hundreds of Silicon Valley 
startups borrowing Uber’s model now operate in what is widely 
termed the “on-demand” economy—so-called because of its ability to 
deliver everything from cleaning services, to accommodations, to food 
deliveries at the click of a mouse or tap of a smartphone button.
127
 
Multimillion-dollar startups such as DoorDash and GrubHub are 
routinely described as the “Uber of food delivery”; Taskrabbit, the 
“Uber of errands”; and Instacart, the “Uber of groceries.”
128
 The “Uber 
of X” category goes on and on, and in theory is seemingly endless. 
According to one recent study, the labor force created by these 
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When MyClean—a startup billed as the “Uber of 
housecleaning”—altered its business model from independent 
contractors to full-time employees in anticipation of misclassification 
suits, the company saw its labor costs soar by some forty percent.
130
 
MyClean’s switch, bear in mind, was done voluntarily.
131
 A court 
ruling mandating such a shift stands poised to affect a category of 
companies whose cumulative valuations, depending on which venture 




Perhaps even more foreboding for on-demand companies is the 
fact that O’Connor is not the first time Uber’s employment 
classification has been litigated in California—and on the earlier 
occasion, Uber ended up on the losing side.
133
 In June of 2015, the 
California Labor Commission resolved an employment 
misclassification dispute brought by Barbara Ann Berwick, a former 
Uber driver who sued the TNC in San Francisco Superior Court.
134
 
Holding that Berwick was a company employee—not a contractor—
the commission awarded her more than $4,000 in reimbursable 
business expenses and accumulated interest, stating, “Without drivers 
such as [Berwick], [Uber’s] business would not exist.”
135
 The 
Commission cited Uber’s exclusive control over the use of its app, the 
“integral” role that drivers play in its business model, and its “non-
negotiable service fee” as the basis for the outcome.
136
 The decision, 
however, is nonbinding and applies only to Berwick herself.
137
 Better 
still from Uber’s perspective, the ruling could be overturned on 
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 The TNC can also take solace from the fact that the 
California Labor Commission’s decision stands in opposition to 
numerous occasions in other states where Uber has “prevailed . . . in 
keeping its definition of drivers as independent contractors.”
139
 
Despite Uber’s victories in other states, some on-demand 
companies apparently regarded the Labor Commission’s decision as 
the proverbial writing on the wall for their workers’ employment 
status. Both Instacart (an on-demand grocery delivery service) and 
Shyp (an on-demand shipping service) moved to preemptively 
reclassify some of their contractors as employees in the weeks 
following the California decision.
140
 Others, already anticipating such 
an outcome, had reclassified their workers long ago, or purposely 
counted their workers as employees from the outset.
141
 Such 
companies “include cleaners MyClean and Managed by Q; laundry 
service FlyCleaners; virtual assistants Zirtual; personal assistants 
Alfred; and delivery service Parcel.”
142
 
Many following the labor disputes believe that O’Connor v. Uber 
Technologies, Inc. is destined to provide the definitive word on the 
legal status of workers hired by on-demand companies.
143
 But what 
fewer realize is that a less conspicuous set of cases may prove to be 
even more decisive. The suits involve dozens of plaintiffs with 
disabilities who have accused Uber and Lyft of violating a federal anti-
discrimination statute known as the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.
144
 The plaintiffs allege that the TNCs have fallen short of their 
statutory obligation to ensure that their drivers do not deny service to 
customers on the basis of a disability.
145
 In response, Uber and Lyft 
have asserted that, as mere technology platforms, they bear no ultimate 
responsibility for their drivers’ conduct.
146
 
Although the two types of cases initially appear to be unrelated, 
their outcomes may, in fact, be inextricably linked. A court ruling 
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requiring Uber and Lyft to take legal responsibility for their drivers’ 
misbehavior would fundamentally alter the employment relationship 
that currently exists between TNCs and their drivers. Such a radical 
shift could, in turn, have profound implications for their drivers’ legal 
status as independent contractors. Indeed, it may be that O’Conner, 
which currently holds Silicon Valley in rapt attention, is actually a 
sideshow of sorts—and a few cases involving disability 
discrimination, which have received a far smaller share of the 
limelight, are the real blockbuster lawsuits that hold the fates of both 
Uber and the on-demand economy within their grasp. 
IV. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE “LAW OF 
MATHEMATICS” 
Jamey Gump is blind, uses a guide dog, and is a 
member of [the National Federation of the Blind] of 
California [(“NFBC”)]. On or about March 23, 2014, 
an UberX[
147
] driver refused to transport Mr. Gump in 
San Leandro, California from a work-related event to 
his home. On that occasion, Mr. Gump used the Uber 
mobile app to summon an UberX taxi. The UberX 
driver pulled the vehicle up to where Mr. Gump was 
standing on the curb and, after noticing that Mr. Gump 
had a dog, said “no pets allowed.” Mr. Gump tried to 
explain that his guide dog was a service animal and 
that the UberX driver had a legal obligation to allow 
the service animal into the vehicle. Mr. Gump 
attempted to show the UberX driver an official guide 
dog identification card issued by his guide dog’s 
training program. The driver adamantly refused to let 
Mr. Gump into the vehicle and drove away. 
[O]n or about May 21, 2014, another UberX driver 
refused to transport Mr. Gump because of his service 
animal. . . . After the requested UberX vehicle had 
pulled up to the curb, Mr. Gump and his friend opened 
a passenger door. The UberX driver began shouting 
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“no dogs!” Mr. Gump tried to explain that his dog was 
a service animal for his disability and was legally 
allowed in the vehicle. The UberX driver began 
shouting and cursing at Mr. Gump and his friend in a 
language that Mr. Gump did not understand. Mr. 
Gump’s friend speaks the language and was offended 
by the profanity and insults. As Mr. Gump attempted to 
enter the vehicle, the UberX driver quickly accelerated 
the vehicle forward, nearly injuring Mr. Gump’s guide 
dog and causing an open passenger door to strike Mr. 
Gump’s friend. The UberX driver then sped away and 
cancelled the ride request. Mr. Gump and his friend 
immediately called the police to file a report and used 
alternative transportation to travel home approximately 
forty-five minutes later. 
[O]n August 20, 2014, Mr. Gump requested an UberX 
ride to pick him up at 214 Van Ness Ave., San 
Francisco, California. Mr. Gump determined from the 
map in the Uber iPhone application that his requested 
vehicle was about to turn onto his street. Mr. Gump 
then went out to the curb with his guide dog in direct 
sight of the oncoming vehicle to intercept the UberX 
driver. Mr. Gump noticed a vehicle slow its speed to a 
near stop in front of him and then accelerate again as it 
passed him on the curb. A few seconds later, Mr. Gump 
received a notification on his phone that the UberX 
driver had cancelled the ride. Mr. Gump then requested 
a second UberX ride, but Uber assigned the exact same 
driver and vehicle to pick up Mr. Gump for a second 
time. Again, a few seconds after Mr. Gump received 
confirmation that this same driver was on the way, the 
driver cancelled on him for a second time. 
[M]r. Gump wants to use the UberX taxi service 
because it is convenient and available near his home, 
an area with limited public transportation. However, he 
stopped using Uber after this most recent experience 
because he concluded that it is not a reliable 
transportation option for him. Notwithstanding Mr. 
Gump’s repeated complaints to Uber about his negative 
experiences over the last several months, his access to 
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Uber’s services has not improved. Mr. Gump hopes that 
Uber will change its policies and practices to better 
prevent discrimination against passengers with service 
animals so that he can enjoy Uber with the same 
convenience and reliability enjoyed by others.
148
 
The above excerpt detailing Jamey Gump’s experiences with Uber 
comes from a complaint filed against the TNC by the National 
Federation of the Blind of California in 2014, alleging that Uber 
discriminated against customers based on their disabilities. The 
complaint documents more than thirty instances “where drivers of 
UberX vehicles refused to transport blind individuals with service 
animals . . . after they initially agreed to transport the riders.”
149
 One 
such plaintiff—a blind woman with a guide dog—accused Uber of 
denying her service on no less than twelve separate occasions.
150
 
Others alleged they were “abandoned . . . in extreme weather” because 
of their guide dogs.
151
 
Some plaintiffs who were not outright denied service by Uber 
drivers joined the complaint after experiencing “harass[ment]” and 
“serious[] mishandl[ing]” of their guide animals by Uber drivers.
152
 
One driver allegedly forced a plaintiff’s guide dog into the trunk of a 
sedan without her knowledge.
153
 When she realized “where the driver 
had placed her dog, she pleaded with the driver to pull over so that she 




People with service animals are not the only individuals with 
disabilities allegedly discriminated against by TNC drivers. In Texas, 
several wheelchair-bound plaintiffs recently filed suit against both 
Uber and Lyft, alleging that the TNCs “allow their vehicles-for-hire to 
deny service to the disabled,” “do not provide vehicles-for-hire 
services to mobility impaired consumers,” “provide [no] manner for 
securing a wheelchair accessible vehicle,” and “provide no training or 
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guidance to the vehicles-for-hire that use their service concerning 
lawfully meeting the needs of disabled customers.”
155
 The plaintiffs 
reported multiple occasions where Uber or Lyft failed to dispatch 




Another woman—a grass-roots disability rights activist—filed suit 
against Lyft in Texas after one of its drivers allegedly left her on the 
curb because of her wheelchair.
157
 In Arizona, too, a retired judge who 




Each of these lawsuits have claimed that the TNCs responsible for 
employing the drivers violated the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”), a federal anti-discrimination statute designed to protect the 
civil rights of people with disabilities.
159
 Title III of the ADA 
“prohibits discrimination against the disabled in the full and equal 
enjoyment of public accommodations and . . . transportation 
services.”
160
 Among other stipulations, entities that provide public 
accommodations, public transportation, or are private companies 
engaged primarily in providing transportation “may not impose 
eligibility criteria that tend to screen out disabled individuals”; must 
make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, 
when such modifications are necessary to provide disabled individuals 
full and equal enjoyment”; and “must remove architectural and 
structural barriers, or if barrier removal is not readily achievable, must 
ensure equal access for the disabled through alternative methods.”
161
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Taxi services, in particular, are forbidden from discriminating “against 
individuals with disabilities by actions including, but not limited to, 
refusing to provide service to individuals with disabilities who can use 
taxi vehicles, refusing to assist with the stowing of mobility devices, 
and charging higher fares or fees for carrying individuals with 
disabilities and their equipment than are charged to other persons.”
162
 
What may come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the litany of 
misconduct alleged by the plaintiffs in the ADA suits is that both Uber 
and Lyft have longstanding policies of non-discrimination that, at least 
in theory, are ADA-compliant. According to Uber’s code of conduct, 
“[i]t is unacceptable to refuse to provide . . . services based on a 
person’s race, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, 
sex, marital status, gender identity, age or any other characteristic 
protected under applicable federal or state law.”
163
 Likewise, “[i]t is 
Lyft’s policy that passengers that use wheelchairs that can safely and 
securely fit in the trunk of the vehicle or backseat [sic] of the car 
without obstructing the view of the driver should be reasonably 
accommodated by drivers on the Lyft platform, and drivers should 
make every reasonable effort to transport the passenger and his or her 
wheelchair.”
164
 Lyft’s policies also provide for the accommodation of 
service animals, but the TNC “recommends that passengers who need 
them call the driver in advance and let them know.”
165
 
                                                                                                                                         
and auxiliary aids need not be provided, if doing so would ‘fundamentally alter’ 
the services or accommodations being offered. Auxiliary aids are also 
unnecessary when they would ‘result in an undue burden.’ As we have noted, 
moreover, the barrier-removal and alternative access requirements do not apply 
when these requirements are not ‘readily achievable.’ Additionally, Title III 
does not impose nondiscrimination or accommodation requirements if, as a 
result, disabled individuals would pose ‘a significant risk to the health or safety 
of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or 
procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
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Uber was careful to emphasize its code of conduct in response to 
some of the negative publicity generated in the wake of the lawsuit 
filed by the NFBC. Spokeswoman Kristin Carvell issued the 
statement, “It is Uber’s policy that driver partners are expected to 
comply with local, state and federal laws regarding the transportation 
of service animals, and we have consistently communicated this policy 
to drivers nationwide.”
166
 The company went on to “den[y] any 
responsibility by saying it doesn’t discriminate against the disabled 
and that it can transport blind and wheelchair-bound passengers.”
167
 
Later that same year, however, David Plouffe—who joined Uber in 
2014 after serving as both White House adviser and campaign 
manager to President Barack Obama—admitted to a slightly more 
nuanced view of the issue: “We’ve got a lot of drivers, so 
unfortunately the law of mathematics is that occasionally we may have 
somebody who doesn’t understand for whatever reason. Sometimes 
we’ve seen instances where people say, ‘well I’ve got leather seats and 
I don’t want a dog on them.’ That’s just not okay.”
168
 
Uber and Lyft reserve the right to discipline or “deactivate” (i.e. 
fire) drivers who breach their anti-discrimination policies.
169
But, 
crucially, both TNCs ultimately disclaim legal liability for riders 
harmed by their drivers’ conduct—each insisting it “only controls its 
smartphone App, and has no ability to require App users to modify 
their personal vehicles or control the conditions under which they 
operate.”
170
 The result of this hands-off approach, says the U.S. 
Department of Justice, who joined NFBC in its suit, is that “Uber 
allegedly fails to respond, does not take steps to address the 
discrimination, and frequently denies responsibility for the 
discrimination” by its drivers.
171
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Meanwhile, riders with disabilities who request a ride through a 
TNC are left with few other options than to cross their fingers and 
wonder: Will I be lucky enough to get a driver who chooses to follow 
the code of conduct? Or will I be paired with one who turns me away? 
This state of uncertainty, according to the long list of plaintiffs who 
have filed suit under the ADA, means that individuals with disabilities 
“have been and continue to be denied access to [Uber’s] services on 
multiple occasions when they attempt to use Uber’s . . . transportation 
service.” 
172
 Moreover, the number of people affected extends far 
beyond those directly denied service. It includes people with 
disabilities who merely catch wind of the incidents and opt not to use 
the service for fear of unexpected delays, unfair cancellation fees, or 
humiliation at the hands of a driver.
173
 
A. The Dilemma of ADA Compliance 
The challenge Uber faces in responding to the array of ADA 
lawsuits brought against it is that handing down a true mandate of 
compliance would require the company to exert more control over its 
drivers than merely drafting anti-discriminatory guidelines. And when 
a company is potentially facing hundreds of millions of dollars in costs 
over the classification of its California workers, that word “control” 
can be cause for serious consternation. In California, “[t]he principal 
test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom 
service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of 
accomplishing the result desired.”
174
 The test is highly complex and 
involves a multifactor analysis (discussed briefly in Part III), but as a 
general rule, it can be understood as follows: The more control an 
employer exerts over its workers, the more likely those workers are to 
be classified as employees. 
Seen through this lens, the ADA suits against both Uber and Lyft 
are, ultimately, cases about control. The plaintiffs insist that TNCs 
must do more to prevent discrimination than “consistently 
communicat[e]” anti-discriminatory policies to drivers.
175
 They claim 
the best way to accomplish such a goal is to hold TNCs legally liable 
for controlling their drivers’ conduct. Uber and Lyft, meanwhile, are 
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unsurprisingly resistant. They are well aware that if traditional cab 
companies offer any indication, the amount of additional control over 
their drivers that a finding of ADA liability would entail might be 
substantial. 
The taxi company Limo Economy Cab of Eau Claire, Wisconsin 
offers an illustrative example. After being investigated by the 
Department of Justice based on allegations that “one of its drivers 
refused to help a customer place his wheelchair in the trunk,” the cab 
company instituted changes that have become standard industry 
practices.
176
 In addition to mandating that its drivers undergo ADA 
compliance training, it also required them “to assist with the stowing 
of mobility devices, to transport service animals in the company of 
individuals with disabilities, to charge the same fares and fees to 
individuals with disabilities accompanied by service animals or 
equipment as is charged to others, to post disability rights and 
complaint notices in taxis, and to maintain a log of all such complaints 
and resolutions.” 
177
 Other cab companies have gone even further. 
Many Chicago taxi companies, for example, require that, in addition to 
general ADA compliance training, their drivers must specifically “take 
classes to learn about service dogs.”
178
 Beyond training, other cab 
companies also operate under a mandate of maintaining a certain 
percentage of wheelchair accessible vehicles in their fleets—a 
stipulation that, if applied to TNCs, would run counter to their 
business model of requiring drivers to provide their own vehicles.
179
 
Uber’s approach to accommodating passengers with disabilities, by 
contrast, has been decidedly more piecemeal. The TNC has responded 
to accusations of discrimination, in part, by increasing its output of 
training and information materials to drivers—including recently 
posting an “online video that drivers can choose to watch, which 
shows how to best assist people with disabilities.”
180
 Uber has also 
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piloted a number of programs over the years that it touts as outreach to 
the disabled community—though few have caught on.
181
 
UberACCESS, a program which “allow[ed] those who need an extra 
hand or even a wheelchair accessible vehicle in Austin[, Texas] to 
request a ride . . . 24 hours a day . . . at the same rates of UberX” 
fizzled out entirely in less than a year for reasons that are unclear.
182
 
To this day, only two programs remain intact.
183
 UberWAV—which 
partners with paratransit drivers to provide wheelchair accessible 
vehicles—claims to have “an average wait time of 7 minutes” in New 
York City.
184
 But outside of New York City, the program remains 
extremely limited in scope. The most successful initiative, by far, has 
been UberASSIST, which is “designed to provide additional assistance 
to seniors and people with disabilities.”
185
 UberASSIST allows 
customers to specifically request drivers who have volunteered to be 
“trained by [the] Open Doors Organization to assist riders into vehicles 
and [a]ccommodate folding wheelchairs, walkers, and scooters.”
186
 
The program has grown rapidly since its recent inception, but still has 
not received widespread adoption outside of major metropolitan areas. 
The program is also limited by the fact that it makes no provisions for 
customers who need specialized accessible vehicles.
187
 
Uber is careful to couch its training materials and disability-related 
initiatives as “tips,” “suggestions,” or “voluntary” programs, so as not 
to imply it is actually exerting control over its drivers.
188
 Yet because 
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of this passive approach, the “law of mathematics” continues to ail the 
company.
189
 Uber has all but admitted that, short of a more forceful 
intervention, incidents of discrimination are bound to continue.
190
 And 
as Harry Campbell, a TNC driver who authors a popular blog with tips 
for Uber and Lyft drivers, points out: “Since Uber doesn’t provide 
much training in the first place, many drivers are left to figure it out 
and often feel like they’re thrown to the wolves, especially when first 
starting. There are a lot of things that Uber asks drivers to do and when 




Both Uber and Lyft recognize that court-mandated ADA 
compliance, alone, is not dispositive when it comes to California’s 
“control” test for employment classification. In fact, many orthodox 
cab drivers in California—all of whom are legally obliged to comply 
with the ADA—are uncontroversially classified as independent 
contractors. But because two federal courts have now ruled that the 
“control” Uber and Lyft currently exert over their drivers is already 
balanced in virtual equipoise between that of contractor and employee, 
both TNCs are highly sensitive to anything that might tilt the scales. 
Therein lays the dilemma. On the one hand, even though both 
TNCs want their drivers to diligently follow anti-discrimination 
policies, truly compelling ADA compliance—through more 
interventionist measures such as mandatory disability training, 
standardized procedures, or wheelchair accessible vehicle quotas—
would risk jeopardizing the drivers’ classification as independent 
contractors. On the other hand, merely setting guidelines that their 
drivers can, and allegedly do, disregard opens the companies up to a 
host of other lawsuits. As Jim Weisman, CEO of the United Spinal 
Association and one of the original framers of the ADA, said, “Uber’s 
quite sensitive to the disability issue, but it’s way more sensitive to its 
way of doing business and its bottom line. As soon as they give in, it’s 
a chink in the armor.”
192
 
From Uber’s standpoint, it is caught between the legal equivalent 
of a rock and a hard place. A ruling in favor of ADA liability would 
unquestionably provide fodder for those who claim Uber’s drivers 
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should be reclassified as employees. Indeed, for all Uber knows, court-
mandated ADA compliance requiring the company to exert additional 
control over its drivers could prove to be the straw that broke the 
jury’s back—resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars of additional 
costs for the company. 
As if those stakes alone were not high enough, Uber is far from the 
only multibillion—much less multimillion—dollar company that 
stands to be affected by the O’Connor verdict. Some commentators 
believe that a ruling in favor of Uber’s drivers could be a harbinger of 
more employment reclassification rulings to come for the on-demand 
economy.
193
 One need only consider the swift reaction to the 
California Labor Commission’s decision by companies such as Shyp 
and Instacart for confirmation of the disquiet felt by many on-demand 
businesses. 
B. Forecasting ADA Liability for Transportation Network 
Companies 
Uber’s and Lyft’s strategy for navigating this dilemma of ADA 
compliance thus far has been to pull a page from their employment 
misclassification playbook. In answer to the lawsuits brought against 
them, both TNCs have asserted a defense reminiscent of those featured 
in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.
194
 
They argue that “Title III [of the ADA] applies only to . . . place[s] of 
public accommodation,” not “technology companies that provide 
platforms for peer-to-peer sharing”; therefore, as a matter of law, the 
plaintiffs failed to state a claim.
195
 The TNCs assert that, far from 
being “public accommodations,” they are not even “transportation 
compan[ies]” because “they do not provide specified public 
transportation services and are not engaged in the business of 
transporting people, but are simply mobile-based ridesharing platforms 
to connect drivers and riders.”
196
 Lyft —just as it had in Cotter—
argues that “it does not own the vehicles drivers use or provide any 
transportation.”
197
 Uber, likewise, contends that it “merely provide[s] a 
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platform for people with particular skills or assets to connect with 
other people looking to pay for those skills or assets.”
198
 
The argument functions, essentially, as an affirmative defense. The 
two TNCs need not deny that the discrimination occurred. Rather, 
according to the theory they both advance, their ADA liability extends 
only as far as the legal reaches of their software; and “since Plaintiffs 




Mystifyingly, though, both TNCs appear to have overlooked a 
fundamental feature of the ADA that renders the first part of their 
argument essentially irrelevant. Namely, that the statute covers more 
than just public accommodations. It also applies to any “private entity 
that is primarily engaged in the business of transporting people whose 
operations affect commerce.”
200
 Indeed, it is precisely this provision 
that subjects traditional taxi companies, which are not public 
accommodations, to the ADA—even private taxi companies whose 
drivers are classified as independent contractors.
201
 As the U.S. 
Department of Justice noted in a brief it filed on behalf of the 
petitioners in the NFBC case, “The success of Plaintiffs’ ADA claim is 
not dependent on a finding that Defendants are a public 
accommodation, because . . . Title III of the ADA applies to private 
entities that are primarily engaged in providing transportation services 
regardless of whether the private entity is a public accommodation.”
202
 
In a February 2015 dismissal of Uber’s and Lyft’s “Motions to 
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint” in Ramos v. Uber Technologies, Inc.—
an ADA suit brought against Uber in Texas—a federal court affirmed 
the Justice Department’s analysis, bluntly remarking that “Uber and 
Lyft misread Title III.”
203
 The court continued, “Title III expressly 
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applies to public accommodations and certain services operated by 
private entities.” Put simply, “[the TNCs’] restrictive reading of Title 
III as governing only public accommodations is contrary to its 
structure and its plain language.”
204
 Accordingly, the court “reject[ed] 
Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs must allege and prove that Uber 




The ruling was not, in and of itself, fatal to the TNCs’ overall 
defense. It simply changed the central legal question from whether 
TNCs are public transportation companies to whether they are 
transportation companies at all. With regard to this question, the court 
proved less willing to offer an opinion. But, here, some of the 
language from rulings in both O’Connor and Cotter may provide 
insight. 
In a 2015 denial of Uber’s Motion for Summary Judgment in 
O’Connor, a San Francisco court stated that while “Uber passes itself 
off as merely a technological intermediary between potential riders 
and potential drivers . . . [t]his argument is fatally flawed in numerous 
respects.”
206
 The court noted: 
[Although] Uber now disclaims that it is a 
“transportation company,” Uber has previously 
referred to itself as an “On–Demand Car Service,” and 
goes by the tagline “Everyone’s Private Driver.” 
Indeed, in commenting on Uber’s planned expansion 
into overseas markets, its CEO wrote on Uber’s official 
blog: “We are ‘Everyone’s Private Driver.’ We are 
Uber and we’re rolling out a transportation system in a 
city near you.” Other Uber documents state that “Uber 
provides the best transportation service in San 
Francisco[.”] Moreover, Uber does not sell its 
software in the manner of a typical distributor. Rather, 
Uber is deeply involved in marketing its transportation 
services, qualifying and selecting drivers, regulating 
and monitoring their performance, disciplining (or 
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In a denial of Lyft’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Cotter, a 
San Francisco court offered an almost identical analysis, stating: 
Lyft tepidly asserts there is no need to decide how to 
classify the drivers, because they don’t perform services 
for Lyft in the first place. Under this theory, Lyft drivers 
perform services only for their riders, while Lyft is an 
uninterested bystander of sorts, merely furnishing a 
platform that allows drivers and riders to connect, 
analogous perhaps to a company like eBay. But that is 
obviously wrong. Lyft concerns itself with far more than 
simply connecting random users of its platform. It 
markets itself to customers as an on-demand ride 
service, and it actively seeks out those customers. It 
gives drivers detailed instructions about how to conduct 
themselves. Notably, Lyft’s own drivers’ guide and 
FAQs state that drivers are “driving for Lyft.” 
Therefore, the argument that Lyft is merely a 
platform . . . is not a serious one.
208
 
The sense among some experts following Uber’s ADA lawsuits 
has been that until a long, hard-fought legal battle “settle[s] whether 
Uber is a software company or transportation company, the disability 
community will just have to be patient.”
209
 But what these two federal 
court rulings suggest is that this question—which lies at the heart of 
the ADA lawsuits—might have already been answered. Uber’s 
liability under the ADA may no longer be a matter of “if,” but a matter 
of “when.” 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Uber’s ADA dilemma stands as a synecdoche for an era 
increasingly defined by the judicial system’s inability to keep pace 
with rapid technological innovation. A few relatively low-profile cases 
involving the ADA have inadvertently turned a seemingly trivial legal 
assumption made years ago by an obscure startup into a question of 
vast economic and moral significance. Hundreds of millions, if not 
billions, of dollars now hang in the balance. So, too, do the rights of 
some 57 million Americans with disabilities, for whom victory in 
Uber’s ADA lawsuits could come to represent a major civil rights 
milestone.
210
 Indeed, to borrow a provocative analogy from Christine 
Griffin, executive director of the Disability Law Center: “If these 
companies said ‘We’re not going to pick up women or African-
Americans,’ all the [customers] supporting them would be running 
away. No one wants to look at this as a civil rights issue, when in fact 
that’s what it is.”
211
 
Though Griffin’s analogy pulls no punches, the importance of her 
framing the issue as one involving civil rights cannot be overstated. 
More than a quarter of a century after the passage of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, troubling disparities in access to transportation 
for people with disabilities persist in the U.S. Of the roughly 57 
million Americans with disabilities, over a third—twice as many as 
those without disabilities—report having inadequate transportation 
options.
212
 Unfortunately, these figures only increase with the severity 
of the disability. People “with very severe disabilities are twice as 
likely to think transportation is a major problem as . . . [those] with a 
somewhat severe disability . . . and three times as likely as those with a 
slight or moderate disability.”
213
 
                                                          
210
 Taylor et al., supra note 42; see also Transportation Equity, supra note 42. 
211
 Dan Adams, Disabled Riders Seek Tougher Rules for Uber, Lyft, BOS. GLOBE 





 Matthew W. Brault, Americans with Disabilities: 2010, CURRENT POPULATIONS 
REPORT (July 2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/3WSW-HFNM]; see also Taylor, supra note 42. 
213
 Taylor, supra note 42; see also Transportation Equity, supra note 42. 
 
164 UMass Law Review v. 12 | 124 
 
For a new breed of companies whose staggering success has 
increasingly led them to market themselves as a viable alternative to 
car ownership, ADA liability presents a prospect for the disabled 
community that was almost unimaginable just a decade ago: true 
transportation equality. In the twenty-five years since the ADA’s 
passage, this prospect has come to represent something of a holy grail 
for disability rights activists, who have long sought in vain for a 
solution to one of the federal statute’s most glaring shortcomings. 
Namely, that the ADA is quite adept at ensuring that places are 
accessible, but not so adept at ensuring that disabled people can 
actually reach those places to begin with. After all, what good is a 
wheelchair accessible building if there is no way for someone in a 
wheelchair to get to it? 
The potential of TNCs to bridge this heretofore unbridgeable gap is 
not lost on those who have filed suit against Uber and Lyft under the 
ADA. But whether this possibility becomes a reality will ultimately 
depend on the continued profitability and viability of the TNC 
business model as it is weathers the storm of legal challenges waiting 
on the horizon. 
Right now, all eyes in Silicon Valley are focused on O’Connor v. 
Uber Technologies, Inc. But what the unique confluence of 
circumstances presented in this piece suggests is that maybe, just 
maybe, those eyes should instead be focused on a less conspicuous set 
of cases that have the potential to shape not only the future of the on-
demand economy, but also the future of the disabled community. 
 
